Abstract: During the nineteenth century, states routinely defeated insurgent foes. Over the twentieth century, however, this pattern reversed itself, with states increas- ingly less likely to defeat insurgents or avoid meeting at least some of their demands. What accounts for this pattern of outcomes in counterinsurgency (COIN) wars? We argue that increasing mechanization within state militaries after World War I is pri- marily responsible for this shift. Unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit information collection among local populations. This not only complicates the process of sifting insurgents from noncombatants but increases the difficulty of selectively applying rewards and pun- ishment among the fence-sitting population. Modern militaries may therefore inad- vertently fuel, rather than deter, insurgencies. We test this argument with a new data set of 286 insurgencies (1800–2005) and a paired comparison of two U.S. Army divisions in Iraq (2003–2004). We find that higher levels of mechanization, along with external support for insurgents and the counterinsurgent’s status as an occu- pier, are associated with an increased probability of state defeat. By contrast, we find only partial support for conventional power- and regime-based explanations, and no support for the view that rough terrain favors insurgent success.
My cliffs:
-Uses empirical data to demonstrate why insurgencies have been more successful in the last century
-primarily caused due to military’s mobilization and disconnect from civilian populations
-“Modern militaries therefore possess comparatively few infantrymen, reducing the rate of interaction simply because fewer soldiers are available for such tasks.”
-“Rather than exercising control, mechanized forces are actually providing only “presence” since their greatest asset, mobility, allows them to cover more ground without having to embed in a particular location.”
-you cant differentiate the enemy from the civilian’s without good information
-more troops on the ground demonstrates to the population that they are in it with them.
-Knowing the public leads to better, more credible information.
-higher success in counter-insurgancy also equals higher casualties.
Interesting. If I understand the argument correctly, it’s essentially arguing that the war on terror is such a hopeless clusterfuck because we’re not establishing relations with locals and thus ensuring that our faceless enemy remains faceless? And that this is different because before unmanned drones and fast moving combat vehicles we would establish relations with the locals who would snitch?
Yep, thats a major point it makes. It is actually counter productive.
Armies used to be forced to forage for food and doing so got to know the population, which gave them insight into intelligence and allowed them to gauge intel quality and such.
The idea behind the troops surge is to better establish the missing relationship with the population. The data is really interesting stuff. Before WWI, incumbent forces were likely to win an insurgent war, now it has reversed. Not in this article, but similarly, the longer an occupier is at war with an insurgency, the worse chance they have of winning.
I think that has more to do with the mentality of “I am going to do what ever I have to that doesn’t piss the taliban off.”
Imagine your family living there. If the Taliban told you they would kill your family if you helped the military, wouldn’t you just keep your mouth shut? I would.
Agreed, but that goes to the point that the “national government” are not the ones who are really in control in many areas of the country. In fact, Kabul has just about zero credibility everywhere but Kabul.
I read this book a couple of years ago, it’s the story of Operation Redwing. 4 Seals went into the mountains in Peshawar I think, stumbled across some goat herders, couldn’t decide whether or not to kill them and couldn’t make contact with home base. Decided to let them go, goat herders alerted the Taliban, 100’s of Taliban shoot the shit out of the four of them. 2 choppers come to their rescue just to get shot down. It was the most SEAL life lost in a single day ever.
One dude survives, gets found by local Pashtuns who grant him Lok Wali or some such shit, meaning they will shelter and protect him, which they do, and then the Rangers rescue him after a couple of weeks.
The surviving Seal (who wrote the book) couldn’t reveal who the target was that they were gathering intelligence on other than it was a VERY high ranking taliban, and right before his rescue he came face to face with him. It doesn’t take much of a leap of faith to guess that this guy came face to face with Bin Laden minutes before the Rangers showed up. Maybe not, but it’s possible.
Gives a lot of insight into this mess. Most of the remote villages have nothing to do with the central Afghani government and want nothing to do with either side of our stupid conflict. Their ancient tribal social customs run very deep. Blah blah blah I’m sick of typing. Read the book if this stuff interests you at all.
I’ve got my copy laying around here somewhere. I’d be happy to pass it along to anyone who wants to read it.
I heard of that story in relation to the recent debacle with the Navy SEALS roughing up some captive.
IIRC one or more of the goat herders were kids and the SEALS team member that survived was the deciding vote to let him/them walk. He regrets that decision.
Goes to show that war is terrible and either you kill innocent civilians to keep your cover or you pay the price in your own blood.
we are just trying to save face at this point so our empire still looks like an empire. Of course this is all at the cost of futhering our country into economic turmoil and outright bankruptcy. The people there will never be able to govern themselves or protect themselves if we keep doing it for them. And the old argument of “we need to teach them to develop their own police force” is quite outdated in my opinion. It is completely pointless to continue this war of lies. We were told the surge worked last time, only to find out recently that 70 to 80 percent of the country is under taliban rule. So how long til this surge stops working and they want even more troops? This is like a merry go round and everyone is throwing up, at least I am.
Decent read. We will never win the war on terror and it was just a rebound after the US was attacked. We are fighting a faceless army that no one knows who is a civilian and who is a terrorist.
Look up the SEAL Team 10 story and how 4 SEALs on a stake out were bumped into by a couple of goat herders. They held the thought to be civilians at gun point and finally decided to let them go instead of kill them to protect themselves and within 2 hours found themselves in a gun fight with 200+ terrorists that took 3 of the 4 members lives and also 16 crew members of a helicopter.
I just want to add one more thing to the mix. It’s been touched on already by Motocrossx23 about the “cruelty of war” and its effect on the occupying country’s populous. I believe a lot of the failure is a direct result of television camera’s and the media sharing the occupying military’s actions with the world and more or less being a tattletale. The occupying military then tends to walk on egg shells to avoid a public outcry rather than doing what it takes.
Just a thought - the research in the first post doesn’t cover the last “surge” in Iraq - which started in 2007, while the previous research period ended in 2005.
And yes, mechanization leads to decreased soldier/indigenous civilian interaction, but then again, we don’t have the manpower (literally) to keep a larger force in place. And foraging (a.k.a. “stealing”) from the locals doesn’t work anymore - the Germans were closely intertwined with the French for 4 years, and we know how that worked out.
And in any case, war is a messy business. Question is, what will our long-term goal be?
At the end of WWII, we had a German insurgency to the early '50s, which eventually settled down as the East-West axis polarized. There’s no such tension in Afghanistan, nor is there an even semi-legitimate government there, unlike Iraq (which is maybe semi-legitimate). Therefore, we don’t have someone local to work with, or those motivated to work with us and change events on the ground like the Awakening Councils. So I don’t think much will change with any COIN strategy, at least in the near term.
So no matter what, we may be doomed to repetetive interventions in the area - surge or not - especially since we have a nuclear-armed Pakistan next door.
